1. Introduction
Motivation
There are many situations in which a number of players play several different games (interact in different markets) simultaneously, and what a player can do in one game is constrained by what he does in the others (so that the games cannot be analyzed separately). Typically, there is a resource constraint: Each player has a limited amount of some resource (time, money, effort, capacity, . . . ) and must decide how much of it to commit to the various "markets" in order to maximize his overall payoff.
Examples include: Strategic investors (with limited budget) in certain asset markets (the subject of this paper), multimarket Cournot oligopoly (with limited capacity), but also political contests where several candidates (with limited time) compete in several constituencies, multiple rent-seeking, etc.
Summary of Results
Given the exogenous supply functions (one for each asset) the strategic players decide how much of their available funds to invest in the various assets. Prices are then set to equate supply and demand in each market, exactly as in the classical market games with fixed supply. But note that the game is no longer constant-sum.
The main contribution of the present paper is a detailed characterization of the structure of the possible Nash equilibria of this asset market game, for the non-symmetric case. The results can be summarized as follows: In the symmetric case, when all supply functions have the same elasticity, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. It is symmetric and coincides with both the "competitive" and the ESS outcomes (here "competitive" is of course to be understood as a situation in which every investor maximizes profits, taking prices-not supply functions-as given). In this equilibrium, prices are proportional to expected payoffs (prices are "fair", or "correspond to fundamentals") and all investors achieve the same rate of return on their capital. This includes the constant supply situation considered in the literature quoted above. Intuitively, when the supply of all assets is constant, the market game is constant-sum, and a player can increase his payoff only at the expense of the others; therefore the maximization of absolute payoffs (Nash) coincides with the maximization of relative payoffs (ESS) 5 .
We show that this continues to hold for variable supply, as long as the supply conditions for all assets are essentially the same (Theorem 4.2). But the point of the paper is the non-symmetric case where the supply conditions for different assets are genuinely different. Then Nash equilibria are not symmetric, and neither ESS nor competitive. Prices are not fair, and different assets have different return rates. More precisely, the lower the elasticity of supply of an asset, the higher its return. Larger investors are more diversified, with the largest investor holding positive quantities of all assets, but smaller investors buy only some of the assets (the smaller, the fewer). Moreover, larger investors necessarily hold relatively more low-yielding assets and achieve lower average rates of return at equilibrium than small investors (Theorem 4.1); this may be termed the "curse of size".
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These somewhat counterintuitive deviations from the competitive outcome, i.e. different rates of return across assets and/or investors, have nothing to do with market imperfections or other reasons like different degrees of risk aversion etc., but come from the heterogeneity of supply, combined with the strategic interplay among large and small investors: at equilibrium, every investor equalizes the marginal, not the average, rates of return of all assets which he holds in positive quantity. Since marginal rates differ from average ones, and also across investors due to their different wealth, we obtain these heterogeneous portfolios.
Equilibrium is unique in the "symmetric" cases (symmetry w.r.t. assets and/or investors, Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3); in general, we can only prove that there exists at most one Nash equilibrium at which all investors hold all assets (Proposition 4.2; there may exist no such equilibrium).
We also consider competitive and ESS outcomes separately. There always exists a unique ESS, and a unique competitive rate of return (the same for all assets). At the ESS, all investors achieve exactly the competitive rate 6 . At any Nash equilibrium that is not ESS, they achieve strictly more (Theorem 5.1,
Theorem 4.4).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model, in Section 3 we study competitive allocations and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium, Section 4 contains the main results, and in Section 5 we study evolutionarily stable strategies. Most proofs, except very short ones, are in the appendix.
Notation and Definitions
We consider an asset market of the kind studied in [1] [2] [3] . There are i = 1, 2, . . . , N risk-neutral investors (N ≥ 2), and k = 1, 2, . . . , K assets (K ≥ 2). The initial endowment (with money) of investor i is W i > 0, and the total money endowment is W := i W i . The (expected) monetary payoff per unit of asset k is E k > 0, and S k (p k ) is the supply function for asset k, where p k ≥ 0 denotes the price (per unit) of asset k. We allow arbitrary supply functions, subject only to the condition that the price elasticity of supply be non-increasing. We denote the supply elasticity of asset k by
and assume, for ∀k:
S.1. The supply function S k (p k ) is continuous and nondecreasing for p k ≥ 0, and strictly positive for p k > 0.
S.2.
The supply function S k (p k ) is twice continuously differentiable (possibly with infinite slope at
Remark: It may be that S k (0) = 0 or S k (0) > 0; we will show (cf. Lemma A.2 in the appendix) that the latter case occurs if and only if supply is constant,
This is the situation Games 2011, 2 213 considered in the literature quoted above 8 . To justify a variable supply in the strategic N -player game among "big" investors which we are going to study, we may imagine that the asset is also held by a large number of small, nonstrategic market participants. These traders are simply willing to sell more of an asset if its price goes up; their aggregate behavior is captured by the supply functions S k . Each investor i invests his whole wealth W i in the K available assets, i.e. he chooses a vector
where w i k ≥ 0 is the amount of money invested in asset k by investor i. The set B i is i's strategy space; it is a nonempty, compact and convex subset of R K + . The joint strategy space is B :
Given w, we write w k := i w i k for the total amount of money invested in asset k by all investors (w i is a vector, but w k is a scalar!). If w k > 0 we say that market k is active (at w). Alternatively (and equivalently), the behavior of an investor i can be described in percentage terms,
i denotes the fraction of investor i's wealth invested in asset k. This formulation makes the game appear more symmetric and is useful in certain contexts (e.g., to study evolutionary stability, see Section 5). The vector α i describes how investor i allocates his money among the various assets (30% in German real estate, 3% in Gold, etc.); for convenience we refer to α i also as investor i's portfolio. Similarly, we use the word "market portfolio" for the vector (w 1 /W, . . . w N /W ), describing the percentage allocation of total wealth W over the K asset types (in the finance literature, the term "market portfolio" has a slightly different meaning, but this should cause no confusion). For p k > 0, we denote by r k : = E k /p k the (gross) rate of return per dollar of asset k. In a competitive equilibrium, with price-taking risk-neutral investors, r k must be the same for all assets (cf. Section 3.1).
REMARK: even though, in the game to be considered below, investors are constrained to choose w i ∈ B i , many of the following considerations do not depend on this restriction, but are valid for arbitrary nonnegative w i ∈ R K . We will therefore, whenever appropriate, pay no attention to the budget constraints and consider arbitrary strategy profiles w ∈ R KN + . Given w ∈ R KN + , the prices p k are determined so as to clear markets, i.e. such that ∀k
It is easy to see (cf. Lemmas A.1, A.3) that this defines a unique price p k = P k (w k ) for every w k ≥ 0; and that the price function p k = P k (w k ) is differentiable and strictly increasing , with P k (0) = 0, lim w k →∞ P k (w k ) = ∞. Therefore the rate of return,
is also a differentiable function of w k , and strictly decreasing in w k , with lim w k →0 R k (w k ) = ∞ and lim w k →∞ R k (w k ) = 0. Note in particular that if the total investment in asset k goes to zero, w k → 0, then the expected rate of return R k = R k (w k ) becomes arbitrarily large. This will ensure that in Nash equilibrium all markets are active. We conclude this section with a formula that will be useful in the sequel. Note that by definition (2), P k (w k )S k (P k (w k )) ≡ w k . Totally differentiating gives:
Using S k = w k /P k we obtain:
Expression (4) is the elasticity of the price p k = P k (w k ) with respect to the total amount of money w k invested in asset k. It lies between zero and one because η k ≥ 0 by S.1 and is equal to one if and only if the supply elasticity
is zero (i.e., supply is constant).
The Market Game
Given a strategy profile w ∈ R KN + , the amount of asset k allocated to investor i is given by:
If market k is active we may also write
If i is the only investor who holds asset k (w
with a discontinuity at w
The payoff of investor i is then given by
These data define the asset market game G among the N investors, with strategy spaces B i and payoff functions π i .
In this formulation the strategies and payoffs of large and small investors are not directly comparable, but we can make them so by expressing everything in percentage terms, i.e. by dividing both the invested amounts w 
is the total amount invested in asset k if the investors use the joint strategy α.
This formulation of the game is quite natural. Indeed, investors frequently describe their strategy by stating how many percent of their total funds they invest in various types of assets, and they describe their payoffs by stating the percentage return on their portfolio (e.g., 4.5% p.a.), not the absolute quantities. We will use the two equivalent formulations G andḠ interchangeably, according to convenience, and refer to both G andḠ as the "asset market game".
Our main interest will be in determining the structure of the Nash equilibria of this game, corresponding to strategic (fully rational) behavior of the agents (Section 4). But we will also consider other solution concepts: Competitive outcomes corresponding to price-taking behavior, and evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in the sense of [11] , which are motivated by certain types of boundedly rational behavior (imitation) (Section 5). The relationships between these solution concepts will also be clarified. Moreover, it is easy to see that the game G is constant-sum if and only if all supply functions S k are constant (see Lemma A.4 in the appendix).
Given a strategy profile w ∈ B, the expected payoff from asset k,
, and the total expected payoff, E(w) : = k E k S k , are determined. We say that investor i follows the proportional investment rule if the amount invested by him in each asset k is proportional to the expected payoff E k S k of this asset, i.e. if there is γ i > 0 such that
; "investing according to the fundamentals").
Competitive Allocations
A profile w = (w 1 , . . . w N ) (resp. the corresponding asset allocation) is called competitive if all assets have the same rate of return, i.e. if there existsr such that for all k
In this case p k = 1 r E k ∀k, i.e. prices are proportional to expected payoffs. We also say that prices are fair. Clearly, in a competitive allocation, the common rate of returnr is equal to the total payoff divided by the total initial money endowmentr
(to see this, use (3) to write w k =r −1 E k S k and sum over k).
Lemma 3.1. There exists a unique competitive rate of returnr > 0. It depends only on the total money endowment W , but not on the distribution of wealth
The properties of the return function R k (·) imply that w k (r) is well defined and strictly decreasing in r (from ∞ to 0); hence there exists a uniquer > 0 such that k w k (r) = W .
In competitive equilibrium the return rater, the pricesp k = E k /r, the profits π i (w) = k w i k R k = W ir , and the amountsŵ k are uniquely determined, but not the asset allocation. Indeed, from the viewpoint of a price-taking investor i, any strategy
is profit maximizing, since all assets yield the same return. Thus there are infinitely many competitive allocations, characterized by the condition that the total amounts w k = N i w i k invested in the various assets satisfy w k =ŵ k . Among these, a special role is played by the proportional investment rule.
Lemma 3.2. (i)
There exists a unique profileŵ ∈ B in which all investors follow the proportional investment rule. This profile is competitive and is given byŵ
(ii) Let w ∈ B be a competitive profile such that all investors hold the same portfolio α i = α j ∀i, j.
Then w =ŵ and
corresponding to the profileŵ ∈ R.
Let us call a profile w = (w 1 , . . . w N ) ∈ B symmetric 9 if all investors hold the same portfolio, i.e. if
says thatŵ is the only symmetric competitive profile. We shall see below that this "proportional competitive profile"ŵ has certain special properties.
In particular, if a Nash equilibrium allocation w is competitive (this is not the case in general), then it coincides withŵ (Propostion 4.1). Moreover,ŵ is the unique profile that is evolutionarily stable in the sense of [11] (Theorem 5.1).
Nash Equilibrium
A profile w * = (w * 1 , . . . w * N ) ∈ B is a Nash equilibrium of the game G if for all investors
where (w i , w * −i ) denotes the profile w * with i's strategy w * i replaced by w i .
equilibrium, all markets are active. (iii) Every equilibrium is strict.
The proof of the theorem is essentially routine, based on the observation that the payoff functions are concave. Some care must be taken because of possible discontinuities at the boundary of the budget sets. Details are in the appendix.
The results on the structure of equilibrium in the next section are based on the following observation. The marginal return to investor i from asset k can be written as
where
, and by (4),
The game G (orḠ) is not symmetric, see Section 5.
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Structure of Nash Equilibrium
This section contains the main results. Consider an equilibrium w = (w 1 , . . . w N ) of G with 
i , for the portfolio associated with w i .
Theorem 4.1. Let w = (w i k ) be an equilibrium, with investors and assets ordered such that
2. the asset with the highest return ( k = K) is held by every investor:
(a) i also holds all assets with higher or equal returns (w i > 0 for r ≥ r k ) (b) all larger investors j ≤ i also hold at least the same quantity of asset k (w j k ≥ w i k ), with strict inequality iff j is strictly larger than i (W j > W i ).
4. larger investors hold relatively more low-yielding assets in the following sense: whenever
. the lower the elasticity of supply for an asset, the higher its return:
. larger investors have lower return rates:
Let w be an equilibrium, and denote by λ i the Lagrange multiplier associated with investor i's budget constraint. By formula (12), the following first-order conditions [FOC] must hold, for i = 1, . . . N :
The proof of the various assertions in the Theorem is based on a careful examination of these first-order conditions. Details are in the appendix. Table 1 summarizes the results of Theorem 4.1. At a Nash equilibrium, in general, different assets have different returns; and not every investor is active in all markets. Larger investors are active in Games 2011, 2 218 more markets. The more elastic the supply of an asset, the lower its return rate at equilibrium. Larger investors hold relatively more low-yielding assets, and achieve lower average rates of return on their capital. Investors with the same wealth use the same strategy. Table 1 . The structure of equilibrium. 
Intuitively, r k is the average return of asset k, and by (12),
is the marginal return of asset k for investor i. The marginal return is always less than the average return r k (because an extra dollar invested in an asset also pushes up its price), but it gets closer to r k when the elasticity η k increases. Since marginal, not average, returns must be equal at equilibrium, we get the inverse relationship between r k and η k asserted in the Theorem. Moreover, the discrepancy between marginal and average return increases with w i k , i.e. it is larger for larger investors Thus with variable supply, Nash equilibrium allocations are not competitive in general (prices are not fair). Example 1 illustrates such a case. This deviation of asset prices from the expected return has nothing to do with risk aversion of our investors, but results from their strategic interaction in a situation where the supply conditions of different assets differ. Of course, in our model, for any asset k, the exogenous supply function S k (p k ) summarizes the aggregate behavior of the (non-strategic) "rest of the market". This "rest" may contain risk-averse traders (or even traders with no rational attitude to risk at all). While we do not model these traders explicitly, it may of course be that the elasticity of supply of some asset k depends on its riskiness; and to the extent that this is the case, our equilibrium prices also reflect risk, at least indirectly.
Moreover, we observe what we have termed the "curse of size": larger investors achieve lower average return rates at equilibrium. Again this has nothing to do with any differences in the skills or preferences of investors, but results from the equalization of marginal, not average, return rates at a Nash equilibrium. A typical small investor concentrates his portfolio on the highest-yielding assets, achieving a high average return rate; and because he is small, his marginal return is high, too. A large investor has a much lower marginal return and finds it profit-maximizing to hold also the lower-yielding assets, thus depressing his average return.
. Assume that the initial endowments are W 1 = 4.75, W 2 = 0.25, so that W = 5. Then the unique Nash equilibrium is given in Table 2 . It is easy to check that the first-order conditions are satisfied, with r 1 > λ 2 , i.e. investor i = 2 does not hold asset k = 1 (w 2 1 = 0). The total payoff at equilibrium is E = π 1 + π 2 = 3, the average return is R = E/W = 0.6, and the competitive rate isr = 0.558. Table 2 . Nash equilibrium in Example 1. 
Theorem 4.2 below shows that the deviation of Nash equilibrium prices from their fair values is not due to the variability (as opposed to constancy) of supply per se, but to differences in the supply conditions of different assets. As a preliminary step, the following proposition shows that the only competitive profile that can possibly be a Nash equilibrium is the "proportional competitive" profileŵ defined in Lemma 3.2. Proof: If the equilibrium satisfies w =ŵ, it is competitive by Lemma 3.2 (i). Conversely, assume that a Nash equilibrium w is competitive. By Lemma 3.1, r k =r, w k =ŵ k ∀k. By Theorem 4.1, all elasticities are equal, η k =η ∀k, and every investor i holds all assets. Therefore the first-order condition for an investor i takes the formr 
for all assets k. Then there exists a unique equilibrium w, and w =ŵ.
The assumption of the Theorem means that all supply functions S k (·) have the same elasticity function, provided units are chosen such that the payoff per unit is the same for all assets. Such a normalization (e.g., E k = 1) is always possible w.l.o.g. (cf. footnote 8). In particular, the assumption of the theorem is satisfied (with H ≡ 0) if supply is constant.
Proof:
We prove that all r k are equal at equilibrium. Let r 1 ≤ r 2 ≤ · · · ≤ r K as in Theorem 4.1.
Therefore r k =r ∀k and the equilibrium is competitive. By Proposition 4.1, w =ŵ uniquely.
A competitive equilibrium, if it exists, is symmetric. There may exist non-competitive symmetric equilibria (cf. Theorem 4.3), but a game can have at most one symmetric equilibrium. In fact, more is true: a game can have at most one equilibrium in which all investors are active in all markets: Proposition 4.2. There is at most one Nash equilibrium in which every investor holds all assets, w i k > 0 ∀i, ∀k.
Since in a symmetric equilibrium every investor must hold all assets, we obtain immediately: Corollary 4.1. There exists at most one symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Another interesting special case is when all investors have the same wealth, W i = W 0 ∀i (but supply elasticities may differ). Are the investors better off at Nash equilibrium than at a competitive profile? Consider an arbitrary profile w ∈ B in which all markets are active, so that the return rates r k = r k (w k ) are well defined for all k. Then the payoff of investor i can be written π i (w) = k w i k r k , and his (gross) rate of return (per dollar invested) is
Games 2011, 2 221 a convex combination of the quantities r 1 , . . . r K . In a competitive profile, r k =r ∀k, so that of course r i =r. If the profile w is not competitive, then some r k must be strictly smaller thanr, and some strictly larger (because the functions r k = R k (w k ) are strictly decreasing, and the sum k w k = W is fixed). Thus it is not clear a priori if an investor's equilibrium rate of return is greater or smaller thanr, especially it is not clear for large investors who hold relatively more low-yielding assets (Theorem 4.1 (4)). In fact, investors never do worse at a Nash equilibrium than at a competitive allocation:
Theorem 4.4. Let w * ∈ B be a Nash equilibrium that is not a competitive allocation. Then every investor i achieves a strictly higher rate of return than the competitive rate:
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for a finite game introduced by [11] is defined for symmetric games as follows. A strategy s in the common strategy space S is an ESS if, starting from a symmetric situation where everybody uses the strategy s, the payoff of a single deviator after deviation is never greater than the payoff of the others (the non-deviators) after this deviation. I.e. no single deviation from the ESS improves the deviator's relative position.
Although this is a static concept, it can sometimes be shown that an ESS is also a stable rest point of some suitably specified "evolutionary" dynamic process of imitation and experimentation ([1]) .
Since the game G is not symmetric due to the unequal wealth of different investors, neither the definition of an ESS nor the idea of imitation is directly applicable. But one can argue that these concepts make sense if we think in percentage terms, i.e., in the more symmetric formulationḠ. Indeed, inḠ, every investor, large or small, has the same strategy space ∆ K , and the payoffs of different players can meaningfully be compared. An investor making 3% with a portfolio of a certain composition might look at some other investor (bigger or smaller) making 4% with a portfolio of a different composition, and might imitate the composition of the other, seemingly more successful, portfolio. In the spirit of bounded rationality, such imitative behavior is certainly justifiable. If we accept this, it becomes meaningful to define an ESS as a strategy which, if adopted by all, cannot be destabilised by a single deviation (under a dynamic driven by imitation of more successful players). The gameḠ resembles a symmetric game because all players have the same strategy space, and any two players using the same strategy α i = α j necessarily have the same payoff. But the gameḠ is still not a symmetric game in the strict sense: if a large and a small investor with different strategies α i , α j interchange their strategies, this may change prices and hence may change the other players' payoffs. Nevertheless, as argued above, we may define a concept of ESS inḠ. For a strategy α 0 ∈ ∆ K , we denote by α 0 = (α 0 , . . . α 0 ) ∈ (∆ K ) N the symmetric profile in which every player uses α 0 . Let us call a strategy α 0 ∈ ∆ K an ESS ofḠ if for every player i and for every strategy α i ∈ ∆ K the following is true:
where (α 0 | i α i ) denotes the strategy profile in which player i uses strategy α i and every other player uses the strategy α 0 . That is, if a player deviates from the symmetric profile α 0 , then, after the deviation,
his payoff is not larger than the payoff of any other player, so that nobody has an incentive to imitate the deviator. On the contrary, the deviator will have an incentive (at least in the weak inequality sense) to imitate one of the other players, i.e. to switch back to the ESS strategy α 0 .
Theorem 5.1. The gameḠ has a unique ESS, namely α 0 =α, whereα is the competitive market portfolio corresponding to the "proportional competitive profile"ŵ defined after Lemma 3.1. At this ESS, all players have the same payoff inḠ, namely the competitive returnπ i ( α 0 ) =r ∀i.
Thus the ESS outcome is competitive, but different from the Nash outcome in general. Such a relation between ESS and competitive outcomes has been observed in other contexts as well, cf. [8, 9] .
A. Appendix
Lemma A.1. Under assumption S.1 (i) for every w k ≥ 0, Equation (2) determines a unique price p k = P k (w k ). The function P k (w k ) is continuous and strictly increasing on [0, ∞), with
Proof:
with the same properties. Since equation (2) can be written V k (p k ) = w k , the price function is equal to this inverse,
The assertion follows from S.1 and (i).
Remark: Conversely, the properties of the price function P k stated in Lemma A.1 imply that the supply function S k satisfies S.1. Indeed, if we postulate an arbitrary price function P k with the properties stated in Lemma A.1, and define a supply function S k by the condition P k (w k )S k (P k (w k )) ≡ w k for w k > 0, and by (15) for w k = 0, then S k satisfies S.1. To see this, write S k (P k (w k )) = w k /P k (w k ) and observe that the 1-1-transformation w k ↔ p k = P k (w k ) is strictly increasing.
For future reference, we note that for any c > 0
The following is a more precise statement of the differentiability assumption in S.1. It is phrased so that an infinite slope at p k = 0 is not excluded.
S.4. For all k, the supply function
¿From now on, we maintain the assumptions S.1, S.4, S.3. Clearly, the elasticity function
is continuously differentiable on (0, ∞) and by S.3, the limit
Lemma A.2. There are only two possible cases: either (i) supply is constant, H k (0) = 0, and
Proof: We omit the subscript k for simplicity.
iff supply is constant (and positive, by S.1): S(p) = S(0) > 0 ∀p ≥ 0. Obviously (iii) is satisfied in this case.
(ii) Assume now that supply is not constant. Then H(0) > 0. By S.1 S(p) > 0 for p > 0. Next we show that S(0) = 0. By definition,
and d dp
Consider first the case of elastic supply at 0, i.e. H(0) > 1. Then, for p > 0 sufficiently small, H(p) > 1, and (18) implies: pS (p) > S(p), i.e., by (19), the positive function S(p)/p is strictly increasing in p. Therefore lim p→0 (S(p)/p) exists and is nonnegative and finite. This implies that S(0) = 0, and furthermore that S (0) = lim p→0 (S(p) − S(0))/p = lim p→0 S(p)/p is finite. Moreover by (18):
S(p) p Both S (p) and S(p)/p tend to the same finite limit S (0) as p → 0, whereas H(p) is bounded away from 1 for all p sufficiently small. This is possible only if S (0) = 0. This proves (ii)(α). Clearly (iii) is also satisfied in this case.
Consider now the case of inelastic or unit elastic supply at 0, 0 < H(0) ≤ 1. Then, for p > 0, H(p) ≤ 1 by S.3, and (18) implies: pS (p) ≤ S(p), i.e., by (19), the positive function S(p)/p is (weakly) decreasing in p. Therefore lim p→0 (S(p)/p) exists and is strictly positive (possibly infinite).
Since
is also weakly decreasing by S.3, the function S (p) must be weakly decreasing, i.e. the supply function S(p) is concave. This implies
It implies also that S (0) > 0 (possibly S (0) = ∞), since otherwise S (p) ≡ 0 and supply would be constant. We want to show that S(0) = 0. If S(0) > 0, then, for p > 0 sufficiently small,
because S(.) is continuous and 0 < H(0) ≤ 1. Therefore S(p) − S(0) < 
On the other hand, by (18),
and for p sufficiently small:
contradicting (21). Therefore S(0) = 0 for 0 < H(0) ≤ 1 as well. Using (18) we see that
so that (iii) is also satisfied. Finally, since S(0) = 0, we have S (0) = lim p→0 (S(p)/p), and using (18) again:
If p → 0, both S (p) and S(p)/p tend to the same positive limit S (0) (possibly infinite) and H(p) tends to H(0). If 0 < H(0) < 1 this is possible only if S (0) = ∞. This proves (ii)(β). If H(0) = 1, it is possible that S (0) is positive and finite; e.g., for S(p) = p, S (p) = 1, H(p) = 1 ∀p ≥ 0. This proves (ii)(γ) and the Lemma.
Lemma A.3.
(where 1/S k (0) = ∞ if S k (0) = 0). proof: (i) For p k > 0, the assertions are trivial. At p k = 0, we have:
By Lemma A.2 (iii), the last term goes to zero for p k → 0, hence
This proves (i).
(ii) The price function P k is the inverse of the function V k . The assertions follow immediately from (i) and this fact, noting that P k (w k ) = 1/V k (p k ) at all points where V k is positive, and that P k has infinite slope at zero iff V k (0) = 0.
Lemma A.4. The game G is constant-sum (on the set {w ∈ B | w k > 0 ∀k} of strategies where all markets are active) if and only if all supply functions S k (·) are constant.
Proof: The "if" part is trivial. Assume now that the game is constant-sum, i.e.,
Proof of Lemma 3.2.
(i) Assume that all investors follow the proportional rule. Then
Summing this over i gives
e. the profile is competitive. Thusŵ k is uniquely determined by R k (ŵ k ) =r. Hence E k S k =rŵ k . Summing this over k gives E(w) =rW , and summing (23) over k gives
(ii) Since w is competitive, w k =ŵ k where R k (ŵ k ) =r ∀k. Since all agents hold the same portfolio
. This is the allocationŵ given in part (i) of the lemma.
To prepare for the proof of First we compute some derivatives. Let w be a profile at which market k is active, i.e., w k > 0,
Therefore, from (12),
with strict inequality unless investor i is the only one who buys asset k (w i k = w k ) and the supply elasticity is zero (
with strict inequality unless w i k = 0, and 
The inequality follows because η k = H k (p k ) ≤ 0 by S.3, and is strict unless w i k = w k and both η k = 0 and η k = 0 10 . The cross-partials are
By (8) similar formulae hold for the profit functions π i , e.g.,
The formal proof of Theorem 3.1 is preceded by some lemmas.
Lemma A.5. For all i, the payoff function of investor i, π
is concave in i's own strategy w i on the set W a , and even strictly concave except possibly at points where w i k = w k for some k (investor i is the only buyer of asset k).
Proof: We have, on the convex set W a :
with strict inequality for w i k < w k and all cross-partials are zero.
Lemma A.6. Letw = (w 1 , . . .w N ) ∈ B be a strategy profile at which not all markets are active (w ∈ W a ). Then every investor has a profitable deviation, i.e. for every i there exists aŵ
Moreover,ŵ i can be chosen so that at the new profileŵ = (ŵ i ,w −i ) all markets are active. 
That is, investor i shifts a small amount ε from asset m to the inactive asset . This shift decreases his earnings in market m by (using (26), (30))
and it increases his earnings in market by E S (P (ε)). By (17) this is strictly greater than εR m for ε sufficiently small, i.e. (32) is satisfied. If is the only inactive market atw, we are done. If not, repeat the construction for the next inactive asset, starting from the profileŵ = (ŵ i ,w −i ).
As an immediate Corollary we have that all markets must be active at equilibrium.
Lemma A.7. If w is an equilibrium, then
Proof: By Lemma A.6, w k > 0 at equilibrium. Therefore, by (25), (28), both claims are true unless
We have to show that this situation is impossible at equilibrium. Indeed, if (34) holds, then w 
Shifting a small amount ε > 0 from asset k to asset increases i's profits, contradicting equilibrium.
In particular, if an asset is in constant supply, then it must be held by more than one investor at equilibrium. Moreover, if w * = (w * i , w * −i ) is an equilibrium, then the payoff function π(w i , w * −i ) is strictly concave in w i in a neighborhood of w * i , and concave elsewhere. Therefore every equilibrium is strict.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Assertions (ii) and (iii) follow from the two preceding Lemmas. It only remains to prove assertion (i) (existence of Nash equilibrium). We claim that w * is an equilibrium in the unrestricted game G with strategy spaces B i . We proceed in two steps:
Step 1. w *
Step 2. ∀i, w * i is a best reply to w *
Step 1. Assume, indirectly, that there is an asset with w * = 0, i.e., w (ν) → 0 for ν → ∞. Of course then also w i (ν) → 0 for each agent i; but since i w i (ν) = w (ν) > 0 always, there exists an agent j such that w j (ν)/w (ν) remains bounded away from 1 as ν → ∞ (taking a further subsequence if necessary).
By (27) this implies ∂x j (w(ν))
There must also exist some asset m = such that w * j m > 0, and hence w *
converges to the finite number
as ν → ∞. Therefore, for ν sufficiently large, agent j can increase his payoff π j (w(ν)) in the game G 
W.l.o.g., order the investors such that
and order the assets such that r 1 ≤ r 2 ≤ · · · ≤ r K .
We shall see below (see (46)) that (39) implies W 1 ≥ W 2 ≥ . . . W N , i.e., investor i = 1 is the largest and i = N is the smallest investor. Similarly, asset k = 1 is the worst and k = K is the best asset, where "better" assets have higher returns per dollar invested. For given i, define k i : = min{k|λ i < r k } (worst asset held by i)
and for given k, define i k : = max{i|λ i < r k } (smallest investor holding k)
It is easy to see that investor i holds exactly the assets k = k i , k i + 1, . . . K and
with k i = k j if λ i = λ j . Similarly, it is also easy to see that asset k is held exactly by the investors i = 1, 2, . . . i k and
with i k = i if r k = r . The equilibrium allocation w = (w i k ) is summarized in Table 1 . The largest investor i = 1 holds all assets (w Table 1 satisfy let r k ≤ r . Then i k ≤ i and w.l.o.g. k < . Summing the first line in (13) for asset k over i = 1, . . . i k gives (since
Summing the first line in (13) for asset also over i = 1, . . . i k gives
If i = i k , the assertion follows directly from (48), (49). If i > i k , then necessarily r > r k (per def. of i k ), and (48), (50) imply Proceeding in this manner until K − = k 0 , we obtain all the inequalities (51) (the remaining ones are trivial). This proves assertion 4 and completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
